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Recent Decisions
CIVIL RIGHTS - STATE BAR EXAMINATION HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
DESPITE DISPROPORTIONATE FAILURE RATE OF MINORITY APPLICANTS -
Richardson v. McFadden'
Four black law school graduates who had failed the South Carolina bar
examination brought suit challenging its constitutionality. The Federal
District Court for the District of South Carolina rejected the plaintiffs'
arguments that the state board of law examiners intentionally discrimi-
nated against blacks in grading bar exams, that the exam was not job-
related, and that the examiners had arbitrarily and capriciously applied
their own standards in grading the examinations of two plaintiffs.2 On
appeal, the black graduates contested the district court's decisions on the
issues of job-relatedness and arbitrary application of standards in grading.3
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially considered whether
the proper test for reviewing the job-relatedness of bar examinations was the
standard delineated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 or
traditional fourteenth amendment tests. It concluded that Title VII
standards were inapplicable. Applying fourteenth amendment criteria, the
court found that the bar examination and its scoring procedures were
sufficiently rational to satisfy equal protection standards,5 but that the bar
1. 540 F.2d 744(4th Cir. 1976) (Craven, J.), rehearing en banc granted, Feb. 11,
1977.
2. Id. at 746.
3. Id. Similar challenges have been directed at other state bar exams. See, e.g.,
Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of the Alabama State Bar, 533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976)
(summary judgment reversed and remanded to permit plaintiffs to complete
discovery); Murry v. The Supreme Court, State of Arizona, No. 72-2101 (9th Cir., Aug.
29, 1973) (dismissal of claim that bar exam was racially discriminatory); Pettit v.
Gingerich, No. 72-964-B (D. Md., Feb. 22, 1977) (defendant's motion for summary
judgment granted); Woodward v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, No. 75-0437-R
(E.D. Va., Sept. 9, 1976) (summary judgment indicating that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to the Virginia bar examination system); Pacheco v.
Pringle, No. C-5219 (D. Colo., May 20, 1976) (action challenging constitutionality of
bar examination system dismissed with prejudice); Lewis v. Hartsock, No. 73-16 (S.D.
Ohio, Mar. 9, 1976) (summary judgment granted defendants) appeal docketed, No. 76-
1884 (6th Cir. July 2, 1976); Carlock v. EEOC, No. 74-365 (D. Ariz., Sept. 30, 1974)
(motion for declaratory judgment that EEOC has no jurisdiction dismissed without
prejudice); Metropolitan Comm. for the Investigation of the D.C. Bar v. Committee on
Admissions, No. 74-177 (D.D.C., Jan. 30, 1974) (dismissed without prejudice); North
Carolina Ass'n of Black Lawyers v. Board of Law Examiners, No. 4488-1973
(E.D.N.C., filed Nov. 1, 1973); In re Illinois Bar Examination, No. 1-576 (Ill. Sup. Ct.,
Mar. 21, 1975) (denial of petition requesting court to appoint a commission to develop
a bar exam which does not have disproportionate racial effect).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970). Appellants advocated adoption of Title
VII job-relatedness criteria. See notes 9 to 11 and accompanying text infra.
5. 540 F.2d at 748-50.
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examiners had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing two of the
appellants. Accordingly, it required the district court to order that two of the
plaintiffs be certified as having passed the South Carolina bar.
The threshold question in Richardson was whether Title VII standards
should play any role in determining whether a practice violates the equal
protection clause. The proscriptions of Title VII extend only to the practices
of employers, labor unions and employment agencies. 7 Because bar exams
are required by state law rather than by any employer or union, they would
not seem to fall within the coverage of the statute,.8 Furthermore, the bar
examiners do not serve as employers, unions, or employment agencies,
because they do not help applicants secure employment. Thus, the
relevance of Title VII with respect to an equal protection inquiry derives
from its concern with analogous problems rather than from its direct
application.
Under Title VII, once a plaintiff shows that an employment test covered
by the statute produces disproportionate racial impact,9 the burden of
proving the absence of discriminatory purpose shifts to the defendant. 10 The
test must be shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be "'predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which the candidates
are being evaluated."" In contrast to the statistical approach of Title VII
cases, alleged violations of the equal protection clause have traditionally
been subjected to a two-tier analysis.12 If state action discriminates with
6. Id. at 752. Plaintiffs also argued that due process was denied by the failure of
the bar examiners to establish a procedure for review of failing scores. Id. at 752. The
district court deferred decision on this issue until it could be presented to the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 744-46.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1970).
8. In some states a passing score on the bar examination is required by statute.
E.g., 4 GA. CODE ANN. § 99-101 (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 93(b) (1976). In other
states, the exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the qualification of applicants is vested
in the highest court both by the state constitution and by statute. E.g., art. V, § 4,
CONsrIuTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1895); S.C. CODE § 56-96 (1962). While the
legislature may pass statutes that seek to control admission to the bar, some courts do
not hesitate to assert their common law power to regulate the licensing of lawyers.
See, e.g., Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969); Puklie
Service Comm'n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 Md. 571, 253 A.2d 845 (1969).
9. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422, 425 (1975); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
10. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425- (1975).
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971).
12. See Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L REv. 1065,
1076-1132 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]. The two-tiered analysis has
been criticized as artificial. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 17-18 (1972). Some have urged that there should be
only one standard, a sliding scale, that would evaluate each classification through a
balancing of state and individual interests. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 464
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 124-26 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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respect to a suspect class 13 or a fundamental right,14 the reviewing court will
scrutinize strictly the rationale for the action. 15 Unless the state can show a
compelling interest justifying the classification, the regulation will fall.16 In
a recent case, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a showing of
discriminatory purpose was also necessary to establish a suspect classifica-
tion that would invoke strict scrutiny. 17 If strict scrutiny is not appropriate,
the reviewing court applies minimum scrutiny' s to the state action, requiring
only a rational relation between the classification and a legitimate state
purpose. 19 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that an intermediate
level of scrutiny may be appropriate in some situations.20
Several federal courts, in cases falling outside the literal application of
the statute, incorporated Title VII standards into their interpretation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.21 These cases involved
challenges to employment tests alleged to exert a disproportionate racial
impact. In order to withstand equal protection scrutiny, the employers were
required to provide professional validation indicating that the challenged
tests were predictive of important elements of work behavior. This extension
13. Race is considered a suspect class. Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. The Supreme Court has recognized fundamental interests arising from
constitutional guarantees and other values implicit in a free society. See Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1965); Equal Protection, supra note 12, at
1127-31. But the Court has expressly refused to determine whether the right to
practice law is a fundamental interest. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232, 239 n.5 (1957).
15. See Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 1087-1103.
16. See id. In order for an employment test to qualify as job-related under strict
scrutiny analysis, there must be a close correlation between test results and job
performance. See Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serve., 374 F.
Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
17. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Accord Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97
S. Ct. 555 (1977).
19. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Gunther, supra note
12, at 19-21. Under minimum scrutiny, an employment test will be upheld if it is
shown to have been designed to measure reasonably the job skills it purports to
measure. See Richardson V. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1976).
20. See notes 77 to 83 .and accompanying text infra.
21. The following circuiits held that, at least with respect to public employees, no
difference existed between the Title VII and the constitutional standard for
determining whether a particular employment practice illegally discriminated on the
basis of race. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (blacks attacked use
of federal service entrance examination); Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919
(4th Cir. 1974) (black teachers attacked use of National Teachers Examination);
United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973) (blacks
attacked school board's policy in determining teacher dismissals); Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons attacked entrance
examinations to police training programs); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd on rehearing, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972) (blacks attacked hiring, examination and recruitment policies of fire depart-
ment).
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of Title VII was the basis for the claim in Richardson that the bar exam
should be evaluated by Title VII job-relatedness criteria.22 In rejecting the
use of Title VII standards to evaluate a bar exam, the Richardson court
relied on Washington v. Davis. 23 The court interpreted Davis as establishing
that, absent proof of discriminatory state purpose, Title VII criteria for job-
relatedness should not be applied in cases where the statute does not, by its
terms, control. Finding that no discriminatory purpose had been shown, 24
the Richardson court concluded that Title VII criteria were not applicable.25
22. In Richardson, the parties agreed that the bar exam was not within the literal
scope of Title VII. 540 F.2d at 747.
23. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
24. Appellants presented the following evidence as proof of discriminatory
purpose:
(1) No black could attend any law school in South Carolina until 1947, when,
in Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C. 1947), Court action forced
the state to establish a "separate but equal" law school for blacks. Brief of Appellant
at 7-8, Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976).
(2) The same year that the state was ordered to admit blacks to a separate law
school, the diploma privilege was abolished. The diploma privilege, which granted
admission to the bar without examination for graduates of law schools within the
state, had existed since 1886. The effective date of abolishment of the diploma
privilege was June, 1950, three years (the period normally required to complete law
school) after the first black students were allowed to attend South Carolina law
schools. Id. at 7-8.
(3) Reading the law as a means of qualifying for the bar had existed for
almost two hundred years in South Carolina. It was abolished within months after a
black-used this route for admission. Id. at 8-9.
(4) South Carolina admitted out-of-state attorneys to the bar through
reciprocity rules until one year after a black attorney applied for admission by
reciprocity. Id. at 8.
(5) The organized bar in South Carolina systematically excluded blacks. Not
until 1970 were blacks admitted to membership in the state bar association. County
associations excluded blacks from social functions, resisted admission of black
attorneys, and tried to form separate white-only lawyer clubs to perform bar functions
in the 1950's and 1960's. Id. at 9.
(6) All or virtually all of the appellants and members of the class they sought
to represent had been required by the law of South Carolina to attend segregated
schools for their elementary and secondary education. Id. at 10.
The Richardson court accepted the appellee's explanation of the changes in
admission practice. 540 F.2d at 747-48. Appellees presented evidence that the South
Carolina Bar Association was on record supporting efforts to abolish both the
diploma privilege and reading the law as early as the 1930's and that the reciprocity
privilege was changed to curb an increasing flow of semi-retired lawyers into the
state. 540 F.2d at 748 n.7.
25. The Fifth Circuit also refused to apply Title VII standards in determining
whether the Georgia bar exam violated the equal protection clause. Tyler v. Vickery,
517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975). The court characterized the application of Title VII
standards to non-Title VII cases through the equal protection clause as a stop-gap
*technique used by several circuits to reach alleged discrimination by public
employers. See note 21 supra. Public employers originally were exempted from the
requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), but a later federal statute, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II 1972)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)), eliminated this exemption. Some circuit courts
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In Davis, a test required for entry into a police training program was
challenged as a source of unconstitutional discrimination against blacks.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had held that discriminatory
purpose was irrelevant and that disproportionate impact alone was
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. 26 The court of appeals
declared that there was "no distinction between the constitutional standard
and the statutory standard under Title VII."'27 In reversing, the Supreme
Court ruled that the court of appeals had erroneously used Title VII
standards to resolve the constitutional issue. "We have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimi-
nation is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we
decline to do so today. ' 2 The Court concluded that adverse disproportionate
impact on a racial group was insufficient, standing alone, to create a racial
classification that should be tested by a standard of strict scrutiny.2 9
Nevertheless, although the Davis Court clearly rejected the importing of
Title VII's threshold standard of disproportionate impact into equal
protection analysis, the decision did not absolutely foreclose the application
of Title VII job-relatedness criteria outside the literal ambit of the statute.
Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion
practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of
blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and
that it is an insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis for
the challenged practices. It is necessary, in addition, that they be
"validated" in terms of job performance in any one of several ways....
However this process proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial
review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executived than is appropriate under the Constitu-
tion where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is
claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for
the purposes of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments in
cases such as this.30
The Davis decision thus leaves open the applicability of Title VII job-
relatedness criteria in cases where the threshold of discriminatory purpose
has been crossed, triggering strict scrutiny. Using Title VII criteria in such a
had used the stop-gap technique to grant relief in cases where the complaints against
public employers were filed before the exemption was eliminated. The Fifth Circuit
refused to accept a principle developed in such "narrow circumstances" as "authority
for the general proposition that Title VII and the equal protection clause should be
read interchangeably." 517 F.2d at 1097. The court, therefore, concluded that "a
constitutional challenge to a method of classification must be decided by constitu-
tional standards" rather than by the statutory Title VII criteria. Id. at 1098 (emphasis
by court).
26. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 958 n.2.
28. 426 U.S. at 239.
29. Id. at 242. See notes 12 to 19 and accompanying text supra.
30. 426 U.S. at 246-48 (emphasis added).
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case would enable courts to measure the constitutional validity of
employment tests by the clear, specific and objective criteria of Title VII.
The Richardson court concluded that, absent a showing of discrimina-
tory purpose, Title VII job-relatedness criteria should not be used to
establish the existence of an equal protection violation.ai This conclusion
seems valid because it would be manifestly unfair to require bar examiners
to meet the rigorous standards of a statute that is not, on its face, applicable
to them. Nevertheless, the opinion's emphasis on discriminatory purpose in
its discussion of the applicability of Title VII standards is significant, for
recognition of this relation suggests that Title VII standards might be
relevant if discriminatory purpose were demonstrated.
After concluding that Title VII standards were inapplicable to this case,
the Fourth Circuit proceeded to apply minimum scrutiny to the South
Carolina bar exam. Accordingly, the court framed the issue as whether
passing the bar exam bears a fair and substantial relationship to minimal
competence to practice law.32 Since the evidence indicated that a significant
relationship existed between law school performance and the bar examina-
tion 33 and that the bar examiners, who were practicing lawyers, had
attempted intelligently to relate exam questions to skills involved in law
practice, 34 the court concluded that the demands of the equal protection
31. 540 F.2d at 747-48.
32. 540 F.2d at 748. In a similar case where blacks challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Maryland bar examination, Judge Blair stated, "The appropriate standard
of review is whether the Maryland Bar examination bears a rational relationship to
the state's admittedly valid interests in professional licensure." Pettit v. Gingerich,
No. B-72-964, slip op. at 19 (D. Md., Feb. 22, 1977). The court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment.
33. Id. at 749. But see Bernreuter, A Report on the Pennsylvania Bar
Examination, 44 PA. BAR Assoc. Q. 533, 534-35 (1973). This reasoning derives from
the Supreme Court's assertion in Davis that a positive correlation between the
entrance test and training school performance demonstrated that the test was job-
related. 426 U.S. at 250-51. Judge Craven noted, however, that this approach, if
pressed to its logical conclusion, might support the contention that bar exams are
unnecessary and invalid.
It is certainly clear that nothing correlates better with training school
performance than training school performance. An applicant for the Bar who has
graduated from an accredited law school arguably may be said to stand before the
Examiners armed with law school grades demonstrating that he possesses
sufficient job-related skills. Why, then, any bar examination at all?
540 F.2d at 749 n.11.
34. The constitutionality of the Maryland bar exam was upheld in Pettit because:
The court believes no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Bar
examination is rationally related to the State's strong interests in the professional
competence of its attorneys. The essay portion of the examination and the [Multi-
State Bar Examination] test a broad spectrum of basic legal principles. The
examination requires rapid legal analysis of fact situations and the ability to
convey that analysis in reasoned written form. These attributes are the hallmark
of the legal profession. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this
issue.
Pettit v. Gingerich, No. B-72-964, slip op. at 22 (D. Md., Feb. 22, 1977).
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clause were satisfied.3 Furthermore, the court determined that the passing
score selected by the bar examiners was rationally related to a determina-
tion of minimal competency: 3 "In view of the fact that all Examiners both
designed their exams and assigned scores so as to indicate their judgment as
to minimal competency, we cannot find the results obtained so unrelated to
the State's objectives as to violate the Equal Protection Clause." 37
Despite this determination that exam scoring was sufficiently related to
minimum competence to withstand equal protection scrutiny, the court
ordered that two of the plaintiffs be admitted to the South Carolina Bar
because the examiners had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing
these two exams.38 The evidence showed that applicants with lower
cumulative scores than each of the plaintiffs had passed the exam. One
explanation proffered by the bar examiners was that the disparity reflected
different configurations of scores among the six examiners. 39 A further
explanation was that the decision in borderline cases often reflected the
examiner's written comments about the applicant's capabilities. 40 These
explanations proved unavailing; the court determined that this recourse to
subjective written comments interjected an element of unconstitutional
arbitrariness into the grading process.
We find reliance on these comments irreconcilable with the Board's
contention that numerical scores are used to capture precise gradations
in performance. It is not possible to pursue the goal of objectivity and
also put ultimate reliance on subjective notes as general and vague as
those cited above.41
Although the court's assessment of the arbitrariness of relying on written
comments may be valid, the remedy granted the two plaintiffs is difficult to
reconcile with the decision that the assignment of a passing score was
sufficiently rational to withstand minimum scrutiny. Grading often
contains elements of subjectivity and arbitrariness, and these flaws are not
35. 540 F.2d at 750.
36. The Maryland district court reached the same conclusion as to the passing
score on the Maryland bar exam. Pettit v. Gingerich, No. B-72-964, slip op. at 22 (D.
Md., Feb. 22, 1977).
37. 540 F.2d at 750.
38. Id. at 751.
39. Id. at 750-51. The bar examiners contended that an applicant with a
cumulative score lower than an applicant who had failed might still pass the exam if
he received a passing score from a larger number of bar examiners than the applicant
with the higher cumulative average. A close examination of the test results, however,
revealed instances where the configuration of scores had been ignored. Id. at 751.
40. Id.
41. Id. This standard of rigorous objectivity can be contrasted with the court's
minimum scrutiny review of the selection of a passing score. That review did not
intimate that numerical scores could "capture precise gradations in performance." To
the contrary, the court admitted that the grading process could be arbitrary and that
numerical grading merely disguised the subjectivity. Despite this evidence that the
grading process suffered from arbitrariness and subjectivity, the court decided that
the exam satisfied the demands of equal protection. Id. at 750 & n.14.
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eliminated by the selection of a numerical score.42 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the level of arbitrariness associated with numerical grades
did not rise to a constitutional violation. The problem with the court's
analysis of the particular exams, therefore, is that it fails to explain why the
arbitrariness of relying on written comments is more objectionable than
strict reliance on numerical grades.43
Having determined that Title VII standards were inapposite, the
Richardson court apparently assumed that minimum scrutiny was the only
possible standard of review, for the opinion fails to consider the relevance of
strict scrutiny44 or the emerging concept of intermediate scrutiny.45
Nevertheless, each of these alternative standards is arguably applicable to
bar exams. Strict scrutiny might be employed because the disproportionate
failure rate of black applicants 46 suggests that the bar exam classifies
according to race. 47 Racial discrimination is not always deliberate; it may
42. Id. at 749-50.
43. The bar examiners petitioned the Fourth Circuit to rehear Richardson en
banc, arguing that the court's remedy, ordering two plaintiffs admitted to the bar, was
an unprecedented and unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the judicial
function performed by the bar examiners. Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976). Rehearing en banc was granted
on Feb. 11, 1977.
44. See notes 12 to 19 and accompanying text supra.
45. See notes 77 to 83 and accompanying text infra.
46. According to the Tyler court, all black applicants failed the Georgia bar exam
in July, 1972; more than fifty percent of black examinees were unsuccessful in
February and July of 1973 as compared to a one-fourth to one-third failure rate among
whites. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975). In Maryland, the black
passing rate from 1962 to 1972 was approximately six percent; whites passed at a rate
of fifty percent in the same period. Pettit v. Gingerich, No. B-72-964, slip op. at 15 n.4
(D. Md., Feb. 22, 1977). The black passing rate improved to twelve percent on ten of
the eleven exams administered prior to the winter 1973 exam. Id.
47. The administration and grading of the bar exams allegedly contribute to the
creation of the suspect classification. See Liacouras, Report of the Philadelphia Bar
Association Special Committee on Pennsylvania Bar Admission Procedures - Racial
Discrimination in Administration of the Pennsylvania Bar Exam, 44 TEMPLE L.Q.
141, 257-58 (1971). Contra Klein, An Examination of Possible Item, Test, and Grader
Bias in the California Bar Examination, 4 BLACK L.J. 553, 560 (1975).
Certain administrative procedures present an opportunity to identify the race
of applicant and to classify arbitrarily on a racial basis. These include use of
photographs, consecutive assignment of examination numbers in alphabetical order
by means of a list of applicants prepared in advance, distribution to proctors of a
master list correlating names with examination numbers, and seating in the
examination room at desks prominently displaying the applicant's examination
number. Liacouras, supra at 196-202.
The methods used to grade bar examinations may also contribute to high
black failure rates. Grading is not standardized, and an examiner may penalize such
things as poor syntax and spelling, which may be symptomatic of blacks' cultural
deprivation. Liacouras, supra at 208-09. The nature of the grading process, in
particular the fact that no one examiner may read the entire essay, has been
characterized as arbitrary and irrational. Liacouras, supra at 210. Determination of a
passing score is also problematic. In some jurisdictions, bar examiners, at their
discretion, raise certain papers to the score required for passing. This is done by
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take the form of unconscious indifference to the situation of the minority
race, so that benefits may be denied or burdens imposed on the minority that
are not denied or imposed on the majority.48 Such racially selective
indifference violates the principle disfavoring classifications based on
race.' 9 But while race is unquestionably a suspect class,50 it is clear that
disproportionate impact alone can not trigger strict scrutiny.51 A showing of
discriminatory purpose is required.52
Because of the difficulties attaching to the proof of discriminatory
purpose,5 3 various factors have been employed in determining whether it
exists. 5' Evidence of the presence or absence of past discriminatory practices
has been considered relevant to finding discriminatory purposes. For
motion where the examiners feel that a borderline paper has sufficient merit to pass.
Id. at 222-23. The Richardson court found that the bar examiners passed white
applicants with lower scores than two of the black plaintiffs. 540 F.2d at 750-52. One
explanation proffered for high black failure rates is that almost all bar examiners are
white. Bell, Do Bar Examinations Serve a Useful Purpose, 57 A.B.A.J. 1215 (1971).
48. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, Foreward: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1976). Unconscious racially
selective indifference may be a factor in continuing to use bar exams which
disproportionately .exclude blacks from the practice of law.
49. Id. at 14-15.
50. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). To be viewed as
suspect, it is not necessary for a racial classification to appear explicitly on the face of
a statute; the suspect classification may be created by application of a facially neutral
statute, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886), or administrative policy,
Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1966).
51. The Fifth Circuit in Tyler concluded that the adverse impact of the Georgia
bar exam did not create a suspect class for strict scrutiny purposes. 517 F.2d 1089,
1101 (5th Cir. 1975). The court cited a body of law holding that a legitimate
classification does not become suspect solely because it adversely and disproportion.
ately affects a racial minority. Id. at 1099. Although noting that "disparate racial
impact alone may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination," the court
held that Georgia bar examiners had met their burden of proof by establishing the
absence of any opportunity to discriminate because the exams were anonymous. Id. at
1100. For a general disgussion of the constitutional status of disproportionate racial
impact see Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125
U. PA. L Rzv. 540 (1977).
52. In Davis, the Supreme Court stated:
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it
does not trigger the rule ... that racial classifications are to be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
426 U.S. at 242. (citations omitted). Accord Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1100-01
(5th Cir. 1975).
53. A focus on the purpose of the decision-maker in equal protection analysis
introduces complex problems of proof, for legislative motivation defies easy
ascertainment or verification. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discrimina-
tory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of
the Court's opinion might assume."); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALa L.J. 1205, 1254-68 (1970).
54. Some commentators have suggested that proof of disproportionate impact
should be treated as a prima facie showing of illegal purpose sufficient to shift the
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example, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 5 the Supreme Court noted that if
a state had a past history of segregated schools, a prima facie equal
protection violation was established which shifted to the state the burden of
proving that current school board actions were not also motivated by
discriminatory purposes.56 The Keyes opinion indicated that past segrega-
tion supported a prima facie inference of discriminatory purpose even where
the past discrimination had not been mandated by statute.57 Demonstration
of the existence and effectiveness of affirmative action programs, however,
may indicate absence of discriminatory purpose. For example, in Davis, the
Court emphasized the fact that the police department was implementing an
affirmative action program to recruit blacks.58 The Court also found
persuasive evidence that forty-four percent of new recruits to the District of
Columbia police department were black. 59
Particularly severe disproportionate impact alone may be proof of
discriminatory purpose. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 60 a San Francisco ordinance
regulating laundries, neutral on its face, was applied in a manner that
effectively eliminated Chinese laundries.61 Out of 280 licensing applications,
local officials approved the applications made by 80 non-Chinese people and
denied the 200 applications made by Chinese people.6 2 Although this uneven
enforcement was the sole evidence of discriminatory purpose, the Court
stated: "[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclu-
sively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the
conclusion, that,. . . no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belong. '6 3
A final factor to be considered in proving a discriminatory purpose is
ability to identify race. In Tyler v. Vickery,64the bar examiners argued that
identification of race was impossible because the exam was anonymous. 65
burden of proving lack of discriminatory intent to defendants. Brest, supra note 48, at
26-31; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 119-21 (1976).
55. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
56. Id. at 205-14. See also Brest, supra note 48, at 46-48.
57. 413 U.S. at 209.
58. 426 U.S. at 254.
59. Id. at 251, 253. The validity of the Court's reliance on this fact is questionable
because blacks comprise over seventy percent of the city's population. BUREAU OP THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1973).
60. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
61. The San Francisco ordinance imposed criminal penalties for operation of a
laundry without written permission from local officials. Id. at 358.
62. Id. at 373-74.
63. Id. A similar result was reached in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-
47 (1960), which struck down a reapportionment plan that effectively excluded blacks
from the city limits of Tuskegee, Alabama.
64. 517 F.2d 1089, 1093 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. Richardson did not discuss whether identification of race of applicant was
possible; there was no discussion of whether the administrative and grading
procedures protected anonymity. In Pettit, Judge Blair, relying on Tyler, examined
the opportunity to discriminate in grading the Maryland bar exam and found that no
such opportunity existed in preparation, administration, or grading of that exam
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The examinees in that case relied on linguistic theory to show that racial
identification was possible despite the appearance of anonymity. This
theory hypothesizes that race can be identified through speech and writing
patterns.6 6 The Tyler court did not find this theory persuasive because
blacks also performed poorly on the multiple choice portion of the Georgia
test 67 and because expert testimony indicated that white southerners speak a
dialect similar to that spoken by blacks. 68
The Richardson court addressed the issue of discriminatory purpose in
the context of its discussion of Title VII job-relatedness, and it discussed
several of these factors.6 9 The court concluded that past practice did not
evidence discriminatory purpose. 70 Indeed, the court suggested that the
absence of prior laws or rules of court expressly prohibiting blacks from
practicing law in South Carolina or imposing a different standard based on
race was perhaps of controlling importance in this case. 71 Although the
Richardson opinion did not explicitly use the Davis technique of examining
the current effectiveness of affirmative action programs, the court consi-
dered the percentage of black lawyers in the South Carolina bar significant
evidence of lack of discriminatory purpose. 72 The question whether the
adverse racial impact alone was severe enough to warrant a finding of
discriminatory purpose was not specifically addressed by the court, but the
appellant's brief alleged that 95.4 percent of white applicants as compared to
55.6 percent of black applicants passed the South Carolina exam from 1968
to 1972.7 3 Apparently the black failure rate on the bar exam, 74 by itself, did
because stringent procedures conclusively ensured anonymity. Pettit v. Gingerich, No.
B-72-964, slip op. at 18-19 (D. Md., Feb. 22, 1977).
66. The average black American initially learns to speak Black English, a
language or dialect which has unique syntax and inflection. See Labov, The Study of
Nonstandard English, in LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTORY READINGS 394-400 (1972);
Raspberry, Should Ghettoese be Accepted, in LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTORY READINGS
413 (1972). This language, and consequently the race of its user, theoretically can be
identified by a reader or listener who cannot see the writer or speaker. See Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1975). But see McDavid, Sense and Nonsense
About American Dialects, in LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTORY READINGS 367 (1972).
67. 517 F.2d at 1094. Nevertheless, evidence from Pennsylvania indicates that
blacks do as well on the multiple-choice portion as whites, but a far higher percentage
of blacks than whites fail the Pennsylvania essay exam. Panel Discussion,
Constitutionality of Bar Examinations, 42 BAR EXAM. 54, 63-64 (1973) (remarks of
Paul Bender) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
68. 517 F.2d at 1094. But see Stewart, Sociolinguistic Factors in Negro Dialects, in
LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTORY READINGS 401, 405-11 (1972).
69. 540 F.2d at 747-48.
70. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
71. 540 F.2d at 747.
72. 3.4% of South Carolina's lawyers are black, a higher percentage than any
other state. Id. at 748 n.6.
73. Brief for Appellant at 3, Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976).
74. It is extremely difficult to assess disproportionate minority failure rates
accurately because most boards of bar examiners do not collect statistics on race.
Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at 13 (remarks of Clyde 0. Bowles). Minority failure
rate statistics are generally compiled by polling minority applicants. See
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not disclose a level of disparity sufficient to indicate discriminatory
purpose. 75 Thus, although the Richardson court did not explicitly discuss the
various equal protection standards,7 6 its findings as to the absence of
discriminatory purpose effectively precluded the application of strict
scrutiny.
The Richardson decision also failed to consider the possible application
of an intermediate level of scrutiny to the equal protection claims. Although
the Supreme Court has only recently acknowledged the use of intermediate
scrutiny, this level of review has been implicit in some of its equal protection
decisions, particularly those dealing with classification on the basis of sex.77
Intermediate scrutiny represents a response to the inadequacy of the
traditional two-tiered analysis, predicated on a sharp dichotomy between
strict and minimum scrutiny. Strict scrutiny has been severely confined
because of its substantial intrusion into the legislative sphere, yet minimum
scrutiny seldom results in a meaningful consideration of the reasonableness
TRANSACTIONS OF THE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY ADMISSION OF BLACKS TO THE BAR IN MARYLAND 183 (1972).
There is general agreement, however, that a disproportionate percentage of
blacks fail. See Shigezawa, Observations - Bar Examiners and Bar'Exams - 1974,
43 BAR ExAM. 147, 149 (1974); Bowles, Status of Suits Attacking'Bar Examination
Committees, 43 BAR EXAM. 133, 142 (1974); Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at 12.
Some estimate that three out of four black law school graduates fail the bar exam on
their first try. See Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at 10. The Philadelphia Bar
Association, after studying the effect of the bar exam on minorities in Pennsylvania,
found that between 1955 and 1970, ninety-eight percent of white examinees eventually
passed but more than thirty percent of black examinees never passed. Panel
Discussion, supra note 67, at 57 (address of Paul Bender).
75. The cases holding that disproportionate impact alone was sufficient proof of
discriminatory purpose involved almost total exclusion of one racial group. E.g.,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (redistricting excluded almost all blacks
from city limits); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (systematic exclusion of blacks
from juries); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (denial of license to all Chinese
applicants).
76. The Tyler court also applied minimum scrutiny; it discussed the propriety of
using strict scrutiny, but it concluded that the standard was not applicable because no
discriminatory purpose had been shown. 517 F.2d at 1100.
77. The notion of intermediate scrutiny first appeared in two Supreme Court
cases: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Gunther, supra note 12, at 34; Ginsberg, Gender in the Supreme Court, the 1973
and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 13. In Reed the state's purpose was to reduce
the administrative workload of probate courts by eliminating the need for a hearing to
determine the individual merits of potential administrators. 404 U.S. at 76. the means
chosen to achieve this end was a statute providing that males must be preferred to
females when courts selected an administrator. Id. at 73. The state sought to justify
the rationality of this preference by the observation that men are better qualified to
act as administrators because they are generally more conversant with business
affairs than women. Brief for Appellee at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as cited
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 n.10' The Court implicitly rejected
appellee's apparently rational explanation of the statutory scheme and held that
although the state had demonstrated a legitimate purpose, the means were chosen
arbitrarily and lacked a rational relationship to the state's objectives. 404 U.S. at 76.
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683; Gunther, supra note 12, at 30.
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of a classification.78 Indeed, the selection of minimum scrutiny virtually
ensures the approval of the legislative classification. 79 In Craig v. Boren, 0
the Supreme Court struck down, as a violation of the equal protection clause,
an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the
age of 21 but permitted the sale of such beer to females who were older than
18. Oklahoma sought to justify the classification by use of statistics
indicating that males of that age group were more likely to become involved
in traffic accidents than were females.8' The Court did not find this
rationale to be a sufficient justification for the classification. "To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. '8 2 Thus, at least
with respect to classifications based on sex, the Court employs a more
careful examination of the state's justifications for a discriminatory
classification than that used in traditional minimum scrutiny.8 3
The intermediate equal protection standard is arguably the proper
standard to apply in testing the constitutionality of bar exams. This
standard developed in cases where classifications affected a class which has
historically been a victim of discrimination,8 4 but which has not been held to
be a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny.8 5 Nevertheless, it appears equally
applicable to the bar exam situation, where strict scrutiny is not triggered
because discriminatory purpose is not shown, yet the classification
disproportionately affects a suspect class. 86 When a neutral classification
78. See Ginsberg, supra note 77, at 11-12 ; Gunther, supra note 12, at 8, 19-20.
79. One commentator has observed; "the 'rational relationship' label ... meant a
virtually automatic pass for challenged legislation. The strict scrutiny stamp
signalled a failing grade." Ginsberg, supra note 77, at 11-12. See Gunther, supra note
12, at 8; Comment, Equal Protection Challenges to the Bar Examination, 1975 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 531, 548-60.
80. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
81. Id. at 458-60. The Court also rejected the argument that the twenty-first
amendment provided a special justification for state regulation of liquor. Id. at 460-
62.
82. Id. at 457.
83. The Craig opinion did not delineate the precise scope of intermediate scrutiny.
Justice Powell expressed his belief that intermediate scrutiny should be limited to sex
classifications. Id. at 464 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, however, indicated
he preferred the flexible balancing of intermediate scrutiny to a rigid two-tiered
analysis. Id. at 464-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). See note 12 supra.
84. Justice Marshall has suggested that application of intermediate scrutiny is
particularly appropriate where the classification involves a class that has tradition-
ally been the victim of discrimination. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 109-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting); See Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 467-68
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973).
85. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (classification based on sex); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (classification based on sex); note 77 supra.
86. The use of intermediate scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of laws
disproportionately affecting a racial minority would allow courts a flexible standard
of review. "The standard of review - the burden of justification - contemplated by
[disproportionate racial impact] theory is more rigorous than that required by the
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disproportionately affects a traditionally oppressed group, suspicion arises
which is best alleviated by a thorough examination of the relationship
between the classification and its purpose.87
The question whether there is a demonstrable relationship between
passing the bar exam and minimum competency to practice law cannot be
answered without thorough analysis of the skills used by attorneys.88 Only
when these skills have been identified can a bar examination be designed
which ensures a rational connection between passing the test and minimal
competency to practice law. Without an analysis of the skills used by
competent attorneys, the bar examiners are "aiming in the dark and can
only hope to achieve job-relatedness by blind luck."8 9 Unfortunately, no
analysis of legal skills has been conducted. 90 Thus, a court utilizing any
rational relationship test but less rigorous than that required by the strict scrutiny
test." Perry, supra note 51, at 559. Application of intermediate scrutiny would be an
appropriate response to the disadvantaged social position of black Americans caused
by centuries of outright racial discrimination in education, employment, and housing.
Id. at 558.
Under [disproportionate racial impact] theory, a court is called upon to balance
the interests of racial minorities against the interests reflected by the laws or
practices in issue. The underlying notion is not that the courts singlehandedly
can remedy the ills afflicting the legatees of slavery and racial oppression, but
that the courts can require agencies of government to attend to the interests of
racial minorities with greater sensitivity.
Id. at 586. In order to determine the constitutionality of a bar exam under an
intermediate scrutiny/disproportionate racial impact analysis, a court would consider
several factors including the degree of disproportionate impact, the efficiency of the
exam in achieving its objective, and the availability of alternative means having a
less disproportionate impact. See id. at 560.
87. See Perry, supra note 51, at 555-62 & n. 99; Equal Protection, supra note 12, at
1173-76. See also Brest, supra note 48, at 5-12.
88. See Equal Protection Challenges to the Bar Examinations, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J.
531, 553-55. A coherent examination of the relationship between job analysis, job-
relatedness and rest validity is contained in Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of
Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
89. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361,
1373 (S.D.N.Y 1974). In that non-Title VII case, diale correctional officers charged
that the test for promotion and permanent appointment to that position discriminated
on a racial basis. In order to prove that the test was sufficiently job-related under
constitutional standards, the court required a demonstration of content validity:
[Dlefendants must demonstrate not only that the knowledge, skills and abilities
tested for . . . coincide with some of the knowledge, skills and abilities required
successfully to perform on the job, but also that 1) the attributes selected for
examination are critical and not merely peripherally related to successful job
performance; 2) the various portions of the examination are accurately weighed to
reflect the relative importance to the job of the attributes for which they test; and
3) the level of difficulty for the exam matches the level of difficulty for the job.
Id. at 1372. The court noted that the cornerstone in developing a valid, job-related test
was analysis of the job to isolate the essential skills required to perform it. Id. at 1373.
No job analysis had been utilized in the creation of the correctional officer's test. The
court therefore found that the test was unconstitutional because it lacked job-
relatedness. Id. at 1382.
90. Dean Liacouris, of the Temple University School of Law, has organized the
beginning of such a study as a follow-up to an earlier study which found that the
19771 899
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
standard other than minimum scrutiny to determine whether passing the
bar exam is rationally related to the ability to practice law would very likely
be forced to declare the exam unconstitutional. The severity of this result,
however, should not deter courts from applying a meaningful equal
protection standard of review.91
Pennsylvania Bar Exam operated to exclude blacks from practicing law in that state.
See Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at 39.
91. Blacks are not alone in demanding that the myth of the bar exam be pierced
by an evaluation of whether the test truly measures who is minimally competent to
practice law. legal educators, white students and non-black minorities have also
attacked the exam's validity. See Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d
474 (7th Cir. 1974) (a candidate who failed attacked the bar exam as not rationally
connected with the ability to practice law); Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners,
438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971) (a candidate who failed attacked the bar exam as
discriminatory); Chaney v. State Bar of California, 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967) (a
candidate who failed attacked the bar exam as fundamentally unfair and improper);
Singleton v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. La. 1976) (a candidate
who failed alleged that arbitrary grading and lack of post-exam review of failing
papers violated due process); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1974)
(recent law school graduates attacked the Mississippi bar exam as invalid absent
professional analysis to determine whether the exam was predictive of ability to
practice law); Gleisner & Bailey, If Your Law School Says You've Mastered the Books
.... Why is the Bar Exam Necessary, 2 STUDENT LAw. 6 (1973); Legal Education and
Bar Examinations: Our Joint Enterprise, 43 BAR EXAM. 44 (1974) (Remarks of Willard
H. Pedrick); Report on Status of Suits Attacking State Bar Examination Committees,
43 BAR EXAM. 133, 135 (1974) (Remarks of Clyde 0. Bowles).
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FEDERAL COURTS - DIVERSITY JURISDICTION - THE MOTIVE FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR Is NOT RELEVANT IN DETERMINING
WHETHER TO USE HIS CITIZENSHIP IN TESTING FOR DIVERSITY - Vaughan v.
Southern Railway'
In 1972, Eldon Swain, a citizen of Virginia, was struck and killed in
North Carolina by a train owned by Southern Railway, a Virginia
corporation having its principal place of business in Washington, D.C. 2 The
decedent's mother, a citizen of Virginia and administratrix and beneficiary
of his estate - the sole asset of which was the potential award for Swain's
wrongful death - sought to bring a wrongful death action against Southern
Railway. Mrs. Swain desired to litigate the matter in North Carolina
because North Carolina law would apply and all of the potential witnesses
resided there. 3 North Carolina law requires, however, that the administrator
commencing a wrongful death action be a North Carolina resident and that
he bring the action in his own name.4 Mrs. Swain chose Charles Vaughan,
an attorney who resided in North Carolina, to serve as administrator.
Vaughan filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, basing his claim of federal jurisdiction on the
diversity of citizenship between himself and Southern Railway. 5
The district court found that Vaughan had been appointed for the
purpose of conferring diversity jurisdiction6 and, thus, that 28 U.S.C. § 1359
mandated dismissal of the action for lack of federal jurisdiction. Section
1359 provides that:
"[A] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."7
1. 542 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 642.
3. Id.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-8, 28-173 (1966) provide in part:
§ 28-8: The clerk shall not issue letters of administration or letters testamentary
to any person who, at the time of appearing to qualify -
(2) Is a nonresident of this State; but a nonresident may qualify as executor.
§ 28-173: When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or
default of another, such as would, if the injured party had lived, have entitled him
to an action for damages therefore, the person or corporation that would have
been so liable . . .to an action for damages, to be brought by the executor,
administrator or collector of the decedent; and this notwithstanding the death,
and although the wrongful act, neglect or default, causing the death, amounts in
law to a felony .... (emphases added).
5. 542 F.2d at 643. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) extends the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to all civil actions between citizens of different states where the matter in
controversy exceeds $10,000.
6. 542 F.2d at 643.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970). Section 1359 had its antecedents in two statutes that
had been designed to prevent the manufacture of diversity. One of these statutes -
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 - precluded the achievement of
diversity through the assignment of most claims; in order to bring an assigned claim
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, per Chief Judge Haynsworth, held that the
citizenship of an administrator who has no stake in the outcome of the
litigation could not be used to confer federal diversity jurisdiction; rather, the
citizenship of the beneficiaries was to control. The court reasoned that
although the appointment of Vaughan represented an effort to comply with
North Carolina law rather than to manufacture diversity jurisdiction, the
attempt to obtain federal jurisdiction on the basis of Vaughan's citizenship
brought the case within the proscriptions of section 1359.8 Therefore, the
dismissal by the district court was proper because there was no diversity
between Mrs. Swain - the sole beneficiary - and the defendant railroad.
Judge Butzner, dissenting, contended that the majority's decision
constituted an unwarranted revision of the traditional rule that the
citizenship of the administrator of a decedent's estate determines diversity
jurisdiction.9 This rule had two recognized exceptions which, according to
Judge Butzner, made further change unnecessary. First, under section 1359
the citizenship of the administrator would not control when the appointment
was motivated by a desire to create diversity jurisdiction. 0 Second, the
administrator's citizenship would not be dispositive "where application of a
state statute requiring a local fiduciary to bring suit would violate the
Supremacy Clause by eliminating federal jurisdiction."" Neither of these
exceptions was applicable in Vaughan because there was no evidence that the
appointment had been made for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction
and there was no conflict with the supremacy clause. The other criticism
levelled by Judge Butzner was that the majority's approach, unlike the
traditional rule, would embroil the courts in determining complicated issues
of jurisdictional facts. 2
Until recently, the prevailing federal law was that the citizenship of a
fiduciary, such as an administrator who brought a lawsuit in his representa-
tive capacity, controlled for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. 3
it was generally necessary that both the assignor and assignee satisfy the requisite
diversity with regard to the opposing party. The other statute prohibited improper or
collusive transactions designed to achieve diversity. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137,
§ 5, 18 Stat. 472. In 1948, these statutes were combined to form 28 U.S.C. § 1359. The
evolution of section 1359 is discussed in Comment, Manufacturing Diversity
Jurisdiction, 14 VILL L. REv. 727, 730-33 (1969).
8. 542 F.2d at 644.
9. See id. at 645 (Butzner, J., dissenting); note 13 infra.
10. Id. at 645-46, n.1.
11. Id. at 646. This exception was applied in Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir.
1972), which is discussed at notes 34 to 41 and accompanying text infra.
12. 542 F.2d at 647 & n.5.
13. The traditional approach ignored the citizenship of parties who possessed no
beneficial interest in the outcome, terming them nominal or formal parties. But one
who possessed the legal right to sue and to represent those having a beneficial
interest in the recovery, such as an administrator, was not treated as a nominal party,
although he might have lacked a beneficial interest. His citizenship, rather than the
citizenship of the beneficiaries, was used in determining diversity. See C. WRIGHT,
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For example, in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,' 4 the Supreme Court
ruled that although an administrator had been appointed for the express
purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction, he was the real party in interest 5
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 29, at 107-09 (3d ed. 1976). A classic statement of this
approach appears in Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172, 175 (1870):
If they [Executors and Trustees] are personally qualified by their citizenship to
bring suit in the Federal courts, the jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that the
parties whom they represent may be disqualified. This has been repeatedly
adjudged.. . . [T]he Chief Justice [Marshall] laid it down as a universal rule that,
in controversies between citizens of different States, the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts depended not upon the relative situation of the parties concerned in
interest, but upon the relative situation of the parties named in the record.
Accord, Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642, 669 (1823). This line of cases was
not dispositive of the issue in Vaughan, however, because of the intervening
enactment of section 1359. See note 7 supra.
14. 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
15. The term "real party in interest" has engendered considerable confusion over
the years because it has both procedural and substantive connotations. In a
procedural sense, "real party in interest" merely refers to the party entitled to bring
suit. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 70, at 330-32. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, reflecting this technical view, adopt a formulistic approach to the
determination of the real party in interest. "Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. An . . . administrator . . . may sue in his own
name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought...."
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Substantively, "real party in interest" has been used to identify
a party who holds a stake in the outcome of the litigation. See Comment, Diversity
Jurisdiction, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 801, 806 (1972). Although a party entitled to bring suit
will normally have a stake in the outcome, to identify a person who has a stake in the
outcome as the "real party in interest" would result in a confusion of the substantive
and procedural meanings of this term.
In testing for the existence of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts have
traditionally confined their inquiry to the citizenship of the procedural "real party in
interest," seldom examining the substantive interests of the parties. See Kennedy,
Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 MINN. L. REV.
675, 678-79 (1967); note 13 supra. But cf. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank,
314 U.S. 63, 67 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.) (the Court realigned the parties contrary to the
pleadings to reflect substantive adversity of interest and then dismissed for lack of
complete diversity). This focus on the procedural "real party in interest" might,
however, fail to disclose whether the case warrants the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction. An administrator, although a procedural "real party in interest," might
not have a substantial interest in the outcome of the dispute. Thus, his citizenship
might bear no relation to the potential for prejudice in a state court which diversity
jurisdiction was designed to remedy. Nevertheless, there are three plausible
explanations for this approach. First, reliance on the "real party in interest" concept
might have reflected a commingling of the procedural and substantive meanings.
Second, the courts might have assumed that in determining jurisdiction, a
controversy should be viewed as a contest between the named parties. See Comment,
Diversity Jurisdiction, supra, at 806-07. Finally, the courts might have preferred this
rule because it is easily applied even though a complicated factual inquiry would
better ensure an exercise of diversity jurisdiction that is consistent with the
underlying purpose of preventing prejudice to out-of-state parties. See C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1557, at 719-20 (1971). Once the federal
courts began applying section 1359 to the appointment of administrators, however,
the "real party in interest" approach was abandoned. See note 31 infra.
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and his citizenship, rather than that of the beneficiaries, would control.16 The
lower federal courts held that the result in Mecom controlled two situations:
(1) where a party attempted to defeat diversity by the appointment of a
nondiverse administrator 7 - the situation in Mecom; and (2) where a party
tried to create diversity by the appointment of a diverse administrator 8 - the
situation in Vaughan as viewed by the court. Although it might seem that
both situations should be treated identically, there are valid reasons for
separating them analytically. There is a strong federal policy of discouraging
diversity jurisdiction. 9 This policy would be served by following Mecom and
16. 284 U.S. at 186-87, 190. In Mecom, the plaintiff, an Oklahoma citizen and
administratrix of her late husband's estate, brought a wrongful death action against
a Louisiana corporation in Oklahoma state court. The defendant removed the action,
and the plaintiff dismissed the suit, apparently preferring a state forum. After this
sequence of events was repeated three times, the plaintiff-administratrix resigned her
position and a new administrator, who resided in Louisiana, refiled the suit in
Oklahoma state court. The Supreme Court, relying on the line of cases discussed in
note 13 supra, allowed this maneuver to defeat diversity. Id. at 184-85.
17. See, e.g., Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1958). But cf. Gentle v. Lamb-
Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161 (D. Me. 1969) (refusing to allow a partial assignment to
defeat removal), noted in 83 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1969). The prevailing approach to the
defeat of diversity has been criticized on the ground that a neutral federal forum may
be most necessary where one party perceives a state forum to be advantageous. See id.
at 469.
18. E.g., Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959) (en banc); see C.
WIGHT, supra note 13, §31, at 115 nn.12, 13 & 14 and cases and authorities cited
therein. In applying the Mecom rule to the creation of diversity situations, the courts
interpreted section 1359 so narrowly as to make it ineffective. For example, the Corabi
court held that if a party's actions were lawful, they were not "improper or collusive"
within the meaning of section 1359, even though the sole motive behind the
appointment was to gain access to federal court. See 264 F.2d at 788. This permissive
reading of section 1359 made it extremely easy to manufacture diversity through the
appointment of a nonresident representative. Indeed, a study of diversity suits
brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that 20.5 percent of the cases
involved the apparent manufacture of diversity through the appointment of a
nonresident representative. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 471 & n.7 (official draft 1969)
[hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]. The Corabi approach to section 1359 was strongly
criticized, see Note, Appointment of Non-Resident Administrators to Create Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 873 (1964), and the Third Circuit eventually
overruled that decision. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
19. Diversity jurisdiction, although expressly provided for in article III of the
Constitution, has been disfavored because it intrudes upon the autonomy of state
courts by allowing federal courts to decide cases arising under state law without the
possibility of state review. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 99. Indeed, the
Judicial Conference of the United States recently recommended the repeal by
Congress of diversity jurisdiction. 45 U.S.LW. 2444 (Mar. 22, 1977). The central
justification for the availability of diversity jurisdiction is the notion that an out-of-
state party may be prejudiced by a local forum. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 101, 105;
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L REv. 483, 492-93
(1928). Although this fear has been denounced as speculative, see id. at 493, 510, a
plausible argument can be made for the continuing validity of this justification. See,
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using the administrator's citizenship in the first situation, where the attempt
is to defeat diversity, but it would not be served by extending Mecom to the
second situation, where the attempt is to create diversity. A more compelling
reason for distinguishing the two situations, however, is the existence of
section 1359, which prohibits the improper or collusive creation of diversity;
there is no comparable statute forbidding the defeat of diversity, improperly
or otherwise. Because Mecom dealt only with the defeat of diversity, its
reasoning arguably should never have been used to support the proposition
that an administrator's appointment, if valid under state law, could not
constitute an improper or collusive attempt to create diversity jurisdiction
within the meaning of section 1359. 20
The Supreme Court first limited this broad reading of Mecom in Kramer
v. Caribbean Mills.21 In Kramer, a foreign corporation assigned a contract
between itself and another foreign corporation to Kramer, a Texas resident,
for a one dollar consideration. By a separate agreement, Kramer agreed to
return ninety-five percent of any net return on the assigned cause of action.
The assignment was admittedly motivated by a desire to create diversity.
The issue was whether this assignment amounted to an improper or
collusive joinder under section 1359, resulting in the defeat of jurisdiction.
The Court found the assignment to be precisely the sort of device that
section 1359 prohibited, stressing the assignee's lack of a stake in the
outcome and the improper motive for the assignment. 22 In response to
Kramer's argument, analogous to the reasoning used in Mecom, that the
assignment was valid under state law and therefore could not be considered
improper or collusive, the Court ruled that the legality of the assignment
was not conclusive on the question whether it could serve as the basis for
federal diversity jurisdiction.23 A footnote in Kramer referred to the Mecom
decision, stating that it was not necessary to decide whether the appoint-
ment of an administrator motivated by a desire to create federal jurisdiction
was also prohibited by section 1359.24
e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 106. Nevertheless, given the inherent tension
between diversity jurisdiction and federalism, it would seem that diversity jurisdiction
should be confined to those situations where there is at least a potential for prejudice.
See id. at 99. But see J.S. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of
State Law, 13 WAYNE St. L. REV. 317, 319-21, 327 (1967). Attempts to manufacture
diversity jurisdiction through the appointment of an out-of-state administrator should
therefore fail because they seek to convert an essentially local controversy into a
federal case.
20. It can be argued that, regardless of the motives for an appointment, the
citizenship of an administrator should not be considered for diversity purposes unless
his involvement in the litigation, which determines his susceptibility to prejudice, is
substantial. See Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293-95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1056 (1974).
21. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
22. Id. at 827-29.
23. Id. at 829.
24. Id. at 828 n.9. The Court noted that appointments might be distinguished
from assignments on three grounds: 1) in an appointment case, some representative
must be appointed before suit can be brought, while an assignor normally can bring
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The issue in Vaughan was whether the appointment of an administrator
from North Carolina as required by the applicable substantive law could
nonetheless be considered "improperly or collusively made . . . to invoke
jurisdiction of [the federal] court" under section 1359, with the result that the
administrator's citizenship would be ignored in testing for diversity. The
Vaughan plaintiff relied on two arguments to establish jurisdiction. First, he
argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Mecom was dispositive of the
case.25 Second, the plaintiff contended that because North Carolina law
required a resident administrator, Mrs. Swain's motive for the appointment
of a North Carolina administrator could not be considered improper or
collusive within the meaning of section 1359, and therefore the administra-
tor's citizenship should control under the rule of Mecom. 26
To succeed in these arguments the plaintiff had to overcome a series of
recent opinions 27 in which the Fourth Circuit had entirely revised its
interpretation of section 1359, making it more difficult to establish diversity
jurisdiction by the appointment of an out-of-state administrator. Seizing on
the new approach of Kramer, the Fourth Circuit soon adopted a narrower
reading of the Mecom holding, finding it no longer a bar to attacks under
section 1359 on the use of out-of-state administrators to create diversity. In
Lester v. McFaddon,28 lawyers for the beneficiary of an estate, which
consisted solely of a wrongful death claim, procured the appointment of an
administrator to bring the action whose citizenship was diverse to that of
the defendant. The administrator had no duties to perform other than to
lend his name to the litigation and was apparently appointed solely for the
purpose of establishing diversity. On appeal from a judgment for the
plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit, raising the jurisdictional question sua sponte,
held the appointment violative of section 1359 as improperly or collusively
made.29 The Lester court distinguished Mecom as not involving the improper
creation of diversity and proceeded to consider whether, and under what
conditions, the appointment of an administrator could activate section 1359.
The court found the administrator appointed in Lester to be indistinguish-
able from the assignee in Kramer because each possessed only a nominal
stake in the outcome of the litigation.30 Although the administrator was the
suit himself; 2) under state law, guardians and administrators may possess
discretionary powers; and 3) all representatives owe their appointment to a state court
decree, rather than solely to the action of the parties.
25. 542 F.2d at 644.
26. Id. (by implication).
27. These cases are: Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1056 (1974); Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972); Lester v. McFaddon, 415
F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).
28. 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 1104, 1108. The court limited its ruling to prospective application
because of the possible detrimental reliance on prior contrary holdings that had read
section 1359 narrowly. Id. at 1106. Accord, McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876-77
(3d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
30. 415 F.2d at 1105. The court's conclusion that the administrator had no stake
in the outcome followed from its assessment of his general duties with regard to the
[VOL. 36
FEDERAL COURTS
real party in interest within the procedural meaning of that term, the Lester
court indicated that section 1359 required an administrator to be the real
party in interest in a substantive sense as well.31 Furthermore, the evidence
showed that the appointment in Lester, like the assignment in Kramer, was
made for the purpose of creating diversity. These factors persuaded the
Lester court that the case should have been dismissed on the basis of section
1359:
If he [the Administrator] has no stake in the outcome, if he is a real
party in interest only in the narrow procedural sense of those words and
his appointment was secured solely for the purpose of creating diversity
of citizenship, the apparent diversity is pretensive. The pretensive
making of a party is improper within the meaning of § 1359.32
This language appears to require both an improper motive and an
administrator with no stake in the outcome for an appointment to violate
section 1359.33 Thus, Lester extended the Kramer interpretation of section
1359 to the appointment of administrators, clearly foreclosing the Vaughan
plaintiff's first argument to sustain jurisdiction based on a broad reading
estate. The court observed: 1) any amount recovered on the wrongful death claim
would be paid directly to the beneficiaries, rather than to the decedent's general
estate; 2) there were no assets in the estate other than the wrongful death claim; 3) it
was doubtful that the administrator would supervise the conduct of the litigation
because he had been procured by the lawyers who were handling the litigation. Id. at
1103.
31. The court clearly distinguished between the procedural concept of real party
in interest, as covered by Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
notion of a real party in interest in the substantive sense of having a stake in the
outcome. See note 15 supra. In the court's view, the determination whether a party is
the procedural real party in interest under Rule 17(a) has no bearing on the
jurisdictional questions whether the parties to a suit possess the requisite diversity of
citizenship. 415 F.2d at 1105-06 & n.10. Accord, McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867,
869-70 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). This focus on the substantive
interest of the parties ensures that federal jurisdiction will be confined to those cases
where the diversity of citizenship is genuine. See note 19 supra. Use of the "real party
in interest" language to describe the substantive interests is nevertheless unfortunate
because of the possible confusion with the procedural meaning. See note 15 supra.
32. 415 F.2d at 1106. Accord, Bartnick v. Reader Co., 487 F.2d 1021, 1022 (8th Cir.
1973) (per curiam); Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763, 766-67 (5th Cir.
1970) (by implication), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1971); O'Brien v. AVCO Corp., 425
F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969).
33. The court subsequently stated:
It is the lack of a stake in the outcome coupled with the motive to bring into a
federal court a local action normally triable only in a state court which is the
common thread of the cases holding actions collusively or improperly brought.
... If either factor is missing, the suit is not collusive or improper.
415 F.2d at 1106 n.11. Thus an appointment motivated by the desire to create federal
jurisdiction would not be objectionable if the named party possessed a substantial
stake in the outcome. Cf. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1928) (jurisdiction upheld where a
Kentucky corporation reincorporated in Tennessee in order to create diversity
jurisdiction for a suit against a Kentucky corporation).
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of Mecom. Lester would, however, seem to support his second argument -
that an administrator must be appointed for the improper motive of creating
diversity before his citizenship could be disregarded on the basis of section
1359.
The next Fourth Circuit opinion to deal with the question whether an
administrator's citizenship should be used to determine diversity involved
the defeat of diversity jurisdiction rather than its creation. Miller v. Perry34
arose when a Florida resident was killed in North Carolina through the
alleged negligence of a North Carolina resident. The father of the decedent,
also a Florida resident, qualified as administrator and filed a wrongful
death claim in the North Carolina federal district court. The district court
dismissed the suit because a North Carolina statute, the same one involved
in Vaughan,35 required the action to be brought by a resident administrator.
Subsequently, the decedent's grandfather, a North Carolina resident, was
appointed ancillary administrator. The lower court again dismissed the
action, this time for want of diversity jurisdiction.36 The Fourth Circuit
reversed the judgment of the district court, upholding federal jurisdiction.
The issue in Miller was whether an administrator's citizenship was to be
used to test for diversity when to do so would defeat diversity. On this
question Mecom could not be distinguished as easily as it had been in
Lester. Furthermore, there was no statute comparable to section 1359 on
which to base a decision to disregard the administrator's citizenship, for
there is no federal law or policy against the defeat of diversity jurisdiction. 37
Nevertheless, the Miller court ignored the administrator's citizenship and
used the citizenship of the beneficiaries to find that diversity existed.
The Miller opinion dealt first with the contention that the North
Carolina statute requiring a wrongful death action to be brought by a
resident administrator was unconstitutional as violative of the supremacy
clause because it insulated North Carolina defendants from the federal
courts. The court noted that this contention would be true only if the rule of
Mecom, requiring the court to use the administrator's citizenship to test for
diversity, were constitutionally mandated. 38 Rejecting this proposition, the
court reasoned that Mecom was not decided on constitutional grounds but
rested instead on the assumption that the administrator possessed
responsibilities and authority sufficient to make him the real party in
interest for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. 39 This assumption was
34. 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
35. See note 4 supra.
36. 456 F.2d at 64.
37. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 875 & n.24 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 903 (1969). See generally note 19 supra.
38. See 456 F.2d at 64.
39. Id. at 65. The court also discounted the contention that Mecom rested on the
principle that devices to defeat diversity jurisdiction are somehow different from
devices to create it. Rather, in the court's view, Mecom "rested on the twin pillars of
the earlier views that looking behind the appointment of an administrator to the
reality was somehow a collateral attack on the order of appointment, and that inquiry
into motive was impermissible." Id. at 66. These views were no longer tenable in light
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subject to reappraisal in light of Kramer, which, in the court's view,
signalled the end to ritualistic application of Mecom and authorized judicial
inquiry into the realities of an appointment to determine the existence of
diversity.4 0 Since the administrator required by North Carolina law
performed only limited duties in connection with the litigation, the Miller
court held that the citizenship of the beneficiaries should be used to test for
diversity. 41
It was clear from Lester and Miller that the Fourth Circuit had rejected
a broad reading of Mecom; in both the creation of diversity and defeat of
diversity situations, an administrator's citizenship could be completely
disregarded for diversity purposes in some circumstances. Yet, the problem
remained of establishing clear standards for determining when an
administrator's citizenship would control and when it would not. Bishop v.
Hendricks42 confronted the Fourth Circuit with another instance of the
apparent manufacture of diversity by the appointment of an administrator.
Once again the court disregarded the administrator's citizenship on the
basis of section 1359, but this time it applied a test based primarily on the
administrator's stake in the outcome. In Bishop a South Carolina resident
was killed in an automobile accident through the alleged negligence of the
South Carolina defendant. The beneficiaries of the estate, also residents of
South Carolina, were advised by counsel to appoint a relative residing in
Georgia as administrator to prosecute the claim.43 The purpose of appointing
an out-of-state fiduciary arguably was to create federal jurisdiction in an
otherwise local controversy. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries contended, and
the district court found, that they had selected the nonresident administra-
tor because he was a competent businessman and not to create diversity. 44
Before the Fourth Circuit the plaintiffs contended that because their motive
was not to create diversity, federal jurisdiction should be sustained against a
charge that the appointment was improper or collusive under section 1359.
In rejecting this argument, the court held that the absence of a motive to
of Kramer. Id. at 67. The Miller case has been criticized for its use of Kramer to
circumvent Mecom. See Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 801, 805,
808-14 (1972); Fourth Circuit Review, 30 WASH. & LEE L REV. 282, 287-89 (1973).
40. 456 F.2d at 65-67. The Miller court based its finding of jurisdiction on the
general diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), even though that statute
does not expressly proscribe devices to defeat diversity. The court reasoned that since
diversity jurisdiction exists to protect nonresidents from the possible prejudice of a
local forum, see 456 F.2d at 67 & n.9; note 19 supra, jurisdiction could be eliminated by
state procedural rules that do not affect the potential for prejudice. 456 F.2d at 67.
Because in every real sense the Miller case represented a controversy between citizens
of different states, jurisdiction under section 1332 was proper. See id.
41. See id. at 67, 68. The court framed its holding in narrow language, restricting
its application to those situations where state law mandated the appointment of the
resident administrator. Id.
42. 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974), discussed in C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
§3640, at 108-10 (1976).
43. 495 F.2d at 290.
44. Id. at 291, 297.
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create diversity does not preclude the application of section 1359; the
administrator's stake in the outcome is the crucial factor.
Accordingly, an appointment of an out-of-state administrator, which is
nominal and "without substance" and which, if given effect for
jurisdictional purposes, has the effect of giving diversity to an action
which does not "really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy" between citizens of different states, is violative of the
purposes of, and falls under the interdict of, Section 1359.
4 5
Examining the administrator's duties in Bishop under this standard, the
court concluded that he was a straw party whose appointment could not
support diversity jurisdiction.46
The strict focus on the activities of the administrator in Bishop differed
from the approach adopted in Lester, which seemed to require both an
improper motive and an administrator with no stake in the outcome to
activate section 1359. Nevertheless, the precise role that the motive for an
appointment was to play in a section 1359 analysis remained unclear after
the Bishop opinion. On one hand, the court seemed to suggest that motive is
entirely irrelevant under section 1359 and the only test is whether the
administrator has a stake in the outcome. 47 On the other hand, the court
implied that some motives might elevate the administrator's relationship to
the litigation above that of a nominal party and thus give him a sufficient
stake in the outcome.48 But it is difficult to conceive of a motive for an
45. Id. at 294 (footnote omitted). But see Aanestad v. Air Canada Inc., 382 F.
Supp. 550, 553 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Farrell v. Ducharme, 310 F. Supp. 254, 260 (D. Vt.
1970) (section 1359 not applicable unless there is no substantial motive for
appointment other than a desire to create diversity).
46. The court concluded that the administrator had "failed to establish any
substantive facts or to assign any valid reasons for his appointment that would give
'substance' to his representation." 495 F.2d at 295. With regard to the administrator's
involvement in the litigation, the court noted: 1) he possessed no financial interest in
the litigation other than the collection of a fee, nor was he exposed to any risk of loss;
2) the beneficiaries could settle the suit without consulting him; 3) the prosecution of
the wrongful death claim was not incidental to other general fiduciary duties; 4) the
administratrator had no -knowledge of the accident that might contribute to the
success of the claim; 5) the administrator played no part in the selection or
supervision of counsel; 6) the administrator's business acumen was irrelevant because
his nominal role in the litigation did not entail any business decisions. Id. at 295-96.
There was no indication of what weight was to be accorded each of these factors in
determining the administrator's status.
47. See id. at 297.
48. The court stated that "any reason or motive for the appointment which does
not elevate [the administrator's] relationship to the litigation above the level of a
nominal party is irrelevant to the issues of diversity." 495 F.2d at 295 (footnote
omitted). This statement suggests that some motives may be relevant. The court
cautioned, however, that "[tihe reason or motive that will render the out-of-state
administrator's citizenship important for diversity purposes must be one that
harmonizes with the thrust and purposes of Section 1359 itself." Id. at 293 (footnote
omitted). The meaning of this language is unclear. Given the court's holding that the
test under section 1359 is whether the administrator has more than a nominal stake
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appointment, unrelated to the underlying characteristics of the estate, that
could drastically change an administrator's interest in the outcome of the
litigation, and the Bishop court did not name any. Vaughan offered the
Fourth Circuit an excellent opportunity to resolve this uncertainty
concerning the relationship between the application of section 1359 and the
motive behind the appointment of the administrator.
The factual setting of Vaughan provided the Fourth Circuit with the
clearest imaginable case of a pure motive: the mother of the decedent was
required by North Carolina law4 9 to appoint a North Carolina administra-
tor, and his citizenship would have satisfied the diversity requirements. As
the court noted, the requirements of the North Carolina statute put "the
purity of her motive beyond question. ' ' 50 The court used this opportunity to
eliminate the confusion left by Bishop, abandoning completely the last
vestiges of a motive test under section 1359. The only test, according to the
Vaughan opinion, is whether the administrator whose citizenship is sought
to be used has some stake in the outcome of the litigation.
Here, Vaughan has no stake in the outcome of the controversy; given
the decision to file the action in North Carolina, his appointment was
not solely for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship, but the
attempt to put it to that use may be regarded as a substantial
equivalent. With no stake in the outcome of the controversy, substantive
diversity of citizenship is as artificial and shadowy as it was in Lester
and in Bishop. In that sense, it is pretense, not reality.51
By scrutinizing the substantive responsibilities of an administrator
whose citizenship is asserted as a basis for jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit
approach will enable federal courts to exclude cases that constitute
controversies between local citizens in all significant respects. Elimination
of such cases preserves diversity jurisdiction where it is necessary yet
precludes the abuses of manufactured diversity. 52 Nevertheless, Vaughan's
elimination of the motive element in the application of section 1359 is
in the outcome, it would seem to follow that the only motives that could harmonize
with the thrust of section 1359 are those relating to the existence of either fiduciary
responsibilities or a beneficial interest establishing a sufficient stake. But if such
interests or responsibilities exist, there would seem to be no reason to consider the
motives for the appointment.
49. See note 4 supra.
50. 542 F.2d at 644.
51. Id. In contrast with Lester, see note 29 supra, the court refused the plaintiff s
request that the Vaughan holding be applied prospectively only, noting that the prior
Fourth Circuit decisions in this area had presaged the result in Vaughan. 542 F.2d at
644-45. Since the plaintiff had failed to file a protective action in state court and the
statute of limitations had run, this ruling meant that there would be no recovery on
Swain's wrongful death claim. Id. & n.4. The Vaughan court apparently concluded
that its interpretation of section 1359 had been sufficiently established to precludejustifiable reliance on contrary authority. For a general discussion of the use of
prospective overruling as a judicial technique, see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS 620-37 (tent. ed. 1958).
52. See note 19 supra.
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troublesome. The language of section 1359 requires an appointment to be
"improperly or collusively made . . . to invoke jurisdiction of [the federal]
court." By its terms the statute would seem to bar jurisdiction only when an
appointment is made for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction. In both
Lester and Kramer, this improper motive was present; in Bishop and
Vaughan, however, an improper motive was absent, at least on the record.
Yet despite the absence of an improper motive, the Fourth Circuit in each
case found the appointment to be violative of section 1359. Although the
Fourth Circuit has achieved a striking degree of symmetry in its treatment
of the jurisdictional status of administrators, the elimination of motive in
the interpretation of section 1359 disregards at least the connotative
meaning of the statutory language. Moreover, the court's emphasis on the
actual duties of the administrator and the realities of the appointment would
seem to relate more to the existence of truly diverse citizenship within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332s 3 than to its artificial creation.54 Whether the
citizenship of an administrator should control the determination of
jurisdiction might therefore be decided by reference to the general purposes
of diversity jurisdiction underlying section 1332.55 Using section 1332 to
decide whether jurisdiction is pretensive would not alter the Fourth Circuit's
analysis in cases where the assertion of diversity rests on the citizenship of
an administrator, because the courts would continue to focus on whether the
substance of diversity jurisdiction - a potential for prejudice in state court
- is present. Furthermore, such an approach would avoid straining the
language of section 1359 and would preserve the motive element in the
interpretation of that statute. Thus, section 1332 could be used to discount
the citizenship of an administrator whose appointment does not affect the
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970); see note 5 supra.
54. The court's concern for the proper exercise of diversity jurisdiction parallels
the views expressed in Miller. In that case the Fourth Circuit ruled that the general
principle of diversity - protecting nonresident parties from prejudice in state court
proceedings - embodied in section 1332 allowed the court to disregard the citizenship
of an administrator and focus instead on the substance of the litigation. See note 40
supra. The apparent implication of Miller is that section 1332 empowers the federal
courts to examine the interests of the parties to determine whether the exercise of
jurisdiction would be consistent with the underlying purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
55. Indeed, the federal courts currently rely on section 1332 to regulate various
aspects of diversity jurisdiction. For instance, where a party deliberately moves to
another state for jurisdictional purposes, the efficacy of that move is determined by
reference to section 1332. The courts have interpreted the term citizen in section 1332
to mean domiciliary. See Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3611, at 697-99
(1975). If a party succeeds in changing his domicile, the courts will not inquire into the
motives for the move. Other examples of jurisdictional determinations grounded
solely on section 1332 are: the realignment of parties to reflect their substantive
interest, id. at § 3607; and disregarding the citizenship of named parties where their
presence defeats the substantive diversity of the controversy, id. at § 3606; Miller v.
Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
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underlying characteristics of the litigation, while section 1359 would be
available to attack appointments motivated by a desire to create diversity.
56
The Vaughan dissent's assertion that the Fourth Circuit's approach
would interject unnecessary costs and complexity into the determination of
jurisdiction also has merit.5 7 Although the majority's desire to ensure that a
finding of diversity comports with the realities of the litigation advances the
general policy disfavoring diversity jurisdiction, the costs of discovering the
substantive duties of an administrator may exceed the benefits of excluding
the few cases where the appearance of diversity is proved to be specious.
58
The determination of an administrator's relation to the litigation may raise
complicated factual questions which require extended discovery and pretrial
hearings.5 9 Moreover, several aspects of the Fourth Circuit rule remain
uncertain. First, what must the administrator show to demonstrate an
adequate stake in the outcome?6 0 Second, does the administrator's
possession of a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, perhaps as
a beneficiary, give him a stake in the outcome sufficient to avoid the
56. It is possible to conceive of circumstances in which section 1359 might be
applicable even though the requisites of section 1332 were satisfied. Suppose, for
instance, that an out-of-state beneficiary were appointed administrator solely to create
diversity. His financial interest in the outcome of the litigation would satisfy the
diversity requirements of section 1332. Nevertheless, jurisdiction might still be
precluded under section 1359 because of the improper motive. See Comment,
Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and Section 1359, 69 COLUM. L. REv.
706, 723-24 (1969).
57. 542 F.2d at 647 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
58. If manufactured diversity becomes a significant drain on judicial resources,
however, see note 18 supra, the Fourth Circuit's vigorous approach might be
beneficial.
59. 542 F.2d at 647. Under the Fourth Circuit's approach, a party must allege and
prove the necessary jurisdictional facts with regard to the administrator.
Furthermore, if the administrator's citizenship is disregarded, he might have to
establish jurisdiction with regard to each beneficiary due to the requirement of
complete diversity. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 31, at 117. This inquiry could be
further complicated if a dispute exists as to the identity of the beneficiaries.
60. The discussions of the administrator's duties in Lester and Bishop, see notes
30 & 46 supra, shed some light on this problem, but do not provide a standard for the
minimum level of involvement that would give an administrator an adequate stake.
In Groh v. Brooks, 421 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit listed the factors that
might be considered in determining whether a representative's citizenship would
control:
[Tihe district court may consider, inter alia, such factors as the identity of the
representative and his relationship to the party represented; the scope of the
representative's powers and duties; any special capacity or experience which the
representative may possess with respect to the purpose of his appointment;
whether there exists a non-diverse party, such as a parent in a suit for injuries to
a child, who might more normally be expected to represent the interests involved;
whether those seeking the appointment of the representative express any
particular reasons for selecting an out-of-state person; and whether, apart from
the appointment of an out-of-state representative, the suit is one wholly local in
nature.
421 F.2d at 595. The Groh court implied, however, that this list was not exhaustive
and that each determination would depend on the facts of the case. Compare Lawson
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application of section 1359?61 Finally, whose citizenship should be
considered once that of the administrator is disregarded?62 Compared with
the simplicity of the Mecom rule, the Fourth Circuit's approach may impose
an unwarranted burden on the courts. Indeed, Chief Judge Haynsworth -
the author of Lester, Miller, and Vaughan - has described the expenditure
of judicial effort regarding jurisdictional determinations of this type as "a
dreadful waste of time."
'63
The American Law Institute's Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts64 has made a proposal that would
eliminate the problems encountered by the Fourth Circuit in the line of cases
from Lester to Vaughan. Section 1301(b)(4) of the Study proposes that for the
purposes of determining jurisdiction, the administrator in a wrongful death
action should be deemed to be a citizen only of the same state as the
decedent. 65 Although reference to a person who is not a party to the
litigation may seem odd, this solution probably reflects the actual potential
for prejudice from a state court proceeding.66 Furthermore, the ALI proposal
is desirable because it offers a simple and fair solution to the jurisdictional
issue in appointment cases. The Study has received considerable critical
approval, and both the Lester and Miller opinions referred to the proposals
as an ideal solution to the problem of manufactured diversity.
6 7
v. Morgan, 352 F. Supp. 282, 284-86 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (section 1359 not applicable
because administratrix aided in the operation of deceased's business as well as
prosecuting wrongful death claim) with Pangaio v. Palmer Township, 343 F. Supp.
940, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (that beneficiaries were not fluent in English does not by itself
justify appointment of an out-of-state administrator whom they trusted).
61. The court in Lester implied that if an administrator possessed a financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation, section 1359 would not apply regardless of
the motives for his appointment. See 415 F.2d at 1106 n.11. But it is not clear why the
existence of a financial interest should obviate the concern of section 1359 with the
attempt to manufacture jurisdiction for an essentially local controversy. See
Comment, Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and Section 1359, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 706, 722-23 (1969) (arguing that an improper motive to create jurisdiction
activates section 1359 regardless of the substance of the transaction). A further
question is the magnitude of an interest that will give the administrator a sufficient
stake in the outcome. Quaere: Kramer v. Carribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823 (1969)
(assignee's 5 percent interest in recovery).
62. See Vaughan v. Southern Ry., 542 F.2d 641, 647 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
63. Diversity Jurisdiction, Multi-Party Litigation, Choice of Law in the Federal
Courts: Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d CONG., 1st Sess., 163 (1971)
(testimony of Clement Haynsworth, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit).
64. ALI STUDY , supra note 18.
65. Id. § 1301(b)(4), at 11.
66. The typical wrongful death case will appear as a contest between the decedent
and the defendant. If both of these parties are citizens of the same state, there is no
danger that a state tribunal will be prejudiced against either party on the basis of
their citizenship. See Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 292 & n.14 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); note 19 supra.
67. Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1972); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d
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Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's decisions in this area have not
approached the simplicity of the ALI proposal. Having rejected the easily
applied rule of Mecom, the court has evolved a potentially complicated
factual test for using an administrator's citizenship that remains unclear in
many important respects.
